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HUSBAND AND WIFE AS "HEIR"
TESTATE SUCCESSION

U

UNDER

WniLiAM F. ZACHARIAS*

PWARDS of three hundred year ago Lord Coke
made the observation, which is nearly as true now
as it was then, that "wills and the construction of them
do more perplex a man, than any other learning, and to
make a certain construction of them, this excedit juris
prudentum artem."' However, there was one problem in
the construction of wills which did not bother the jurists
of that age, but which has risen to vex the profession
since then-the construction to be placed on the word
"heir" in the light of the modern statutes of descent and
distribution which usually provide a husband or wife
with a vested interest in the property of the other deceased spouse.
The technical definition of heir, as it was approved in
Lord Coke's time was: "He upon whom the law casts the
estate immediately on the death of the ancestor," ' 2 or to
use the definition in Bouvier's Law Dictionary: "One
born in lawful wedlock who succeeds by descent, and right
of blood, to lands, tenements, and hereditaments, being
an estate of inheritance."' In that state of the law, of
course, there was no room for argument on the proposition that neither the husband nor the wife could possibly
be deemed the heir of the other.
But the early American legislatures were not satisfied
with the common law rules of descent and distribution,
and the accompanying estates of curtesy and dower, and
soon passed statutes altering them. They have also, from
time to time, enlarged the share given the spouse until
today the surviving husband or wife of an intestate person takes as much as the entire personalty and one-half
the realty in fee in the event of death without issue.
* Member of Illinois Bar: professor of law at Chicago-Kent College of Law.
'Roberts v. Roberts, 2 Bulst. 123,130, 80 Eng. Rep. 1002, 1008 (1614).
2 Blackstone, II, Ch. 14, p. 201.
S Bouvier's Law Dict., (4th Ed.) Vol. 1, p. 582.
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The right of the legislature so to amend the laws relating to intestate property is now unquestioned, regardless of Glanville's comment as to the necessity of divine
intervention to produce an heir,4 and, of course, in such
cases the spouse's right to take as an heir is not denied.5
From the outset, therefore, all question of intestate succession is excluded, and we shall confine our discussion
to those problems which arise in cases where the property
owner dies testate.
As to testate succession, Jarman says:
Gifts to the heir, whether of the testator himself, or of another,
are so frequently found in wills, and where these instruments
are the production of persons unskilled in technical language,
the term heir is so often used in a vague and inaccurate sense,
that to ascertain and fix its signification in regard to real and
personal estate respectively, whether alone or in conjunction with
other phrases which most usually accompany it, is a point of no
inconsiderable importance.6

The problem in such cases usually arises when the deceased testator or testatrix, after providing a suitable
estate for the surviving spouse,7 devises or bequeaths the
balance of the estate to his or her "heirs." In such case
the surviving spouse usually claims, and sometimes receives, a vested share in the remainder on the theory that
4 Blaine's Glanville, p. 143.
5
Kochersperger v. Drake, 167 Ill. 122 (1897), holding, "The right to inherit
and the right to devise being dependent on legislative acts, there is nothing in
the constitution of this state, which prohibits a change of the law with reference to those subjects at the discretion of the law-making power." State
ex rel. Lockhart v. Mason, 21 Ind. 171 (1863), states, "It is undoubtedly competent for the Legislature to determine, upon the death of a person, upon
whom the descent of his property shall be cast; that is to say, who shall be
his legal heirs." McKinney v. Stewart, 5 Kan. 384 (1870), to the effect that
"The statute may make any person an heir. An heir at law is simply one
who succeeds to the estate of a deceased person." Menard v. Campbell, 180
Mich. 583, 147 N. W. 556 (1914); In re Shumway's Estate, 194 Mich. 245,
160 N. W. 595 (1916).
Rood on Wills, sec. 450 states: " . . . where the
statutes make any part of the intestate lards descend to the surviving spouse,
such spouse is thereby made heir." See also Ill. Stat. Ch. 39, sec. 1, clause 3.
6
Jarman on Wills (7th Ed., 1930), p. 1526.
7 Underhill on Wills, II, 832, states "the fact that the testator has made
a substantial testamentary provision for his widow in lieu of dower and then
has devised all the residue to his 'heirs' may raise a strong presumption that
he does not intend she shall take as one of his heirs."
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he or she is included within the term heirs as used in the
Will, because, so that argument runs, the heirs are to be
determined by the intestate laws of the jurisdiction and
any person receiving a vested share by the language of
that statute is or should be included as a devisee. On the
other hand, runs the counter-argument of the blood kin
of the testator, the term heirs should be defined as it was
at common law, or in the manner the testator intended it
should be construed, and if so, then the spouse should be
excluded from the residue and confined solely to the portion given him or her by the express language of the will.8
The question, then, becomes one of local law, and, as
would be expecte.d in such a case, there are several solutions to be found, differing not only as to the several
states and the distinct methods of approach used by the
several courts, but also differing between the nature of
the property concerned and the size or degree of estate
given the spouse by the intestate laws of the several
states at different times in their legal history.
To avoid too much repetition, since the possible
grounds for including or excluding the spouse from the
definition of the term heirs are more or less limited, it
is deemed appropriate to take the judicial decisions of
Illinois, since, from the standpoint of historical development of the subject, this state affords a representative
example, and the number of its pertinent decisions exceeds that of most othersY
The earliest case in Illinois was Rawson v. Rawson,10
decided in 1869, in which case an estate consisting solely
of personalty was ordered distributed "to my heirs at
law according to the statutes of the State of Illinois for
8 Shriver v. Shriver, 127 Md. 486, 96 A. 615 (1916), sets the keynote for this.
line of argument by stating: "When used to designate devisees of real estate,
and when a different interpretation is not required by the context, the word
'heirs' is confined to its primary significance, and is applied exclusively to
those who would inherit the land of the ancestor to whom reference is made
for their identification."
9 The precise problem has never been considered by the courts of Arizona,
Idaho, Louisiana, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
10 52 1ll. 62.
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such case made and provided." There being no issue, the
widow claimed the entire estate, while the other heirs
claimed that since the widow had not renounced she
should only be given dower in the personalty. The court,
awarding the entire personal estate to the widow, held:
....as there is nothing in the will calling for a particular or
special construction to be placed upon the term "heirs at law,"
as used in the will, it must be interpreted according to its strict,
technical import; that heirs at law are such as are made so by the
statute, and are the person or persons on whom the law casts the
estate in case of intestacy; that the widow of the testator is
within the contingencies specified in the statute, and is the heir
at law to this estate ....11
Three years later, in Richards v. Miller,12 the court
passed on a will involving realty, by which the testatrix,
after giving her husband $2000 and certain personal
items, devised the remainder of her estate to "my heirs
at law." In giving the husband a statutory share, the
court said:
Where the will gave the residue of the estate to the heirs at law,
uncontrolled by any other words, the property must descend
according to the law of the place where it is situated, and where
the will is to be carried into effect. 13
The next case involved the proceeds of an insurance
policy made payable to the "legal heirs or assigns" of
the assured,14 and the dispute arose between the widow
and children surviving. The court refused to follow the
two preceding cases on the ground that no issue survived
in those cases, pointed out that the share given the widow
by the fourth clause of section 1, chapter 39, of the Revised Statutes of 1874, entitled "Descent," was in the
nature of dower, and went on to say:
We know of no respectable authority, and venture there is none,
holding that one entitled to dower or an interest in the nature of
11 52 III. 62, p. 69-70.
12 62 111. 417 (1872).

1362 III. 417, 423.
14Guch v. St. Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co., 88 Ill.
251 (1878).
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dower, or any allowance of personal property only, because of
the survivorship of the husband or wife, is held to be included
within the legal definition of "heir." Nor is the distinction between the word "widow" and the word "heir" less marked in
common parlance. No one, having children, speaks of his wife,
in contemplation of her survivorship, as his "heir;" but it is
believed it is universal that she is referred to as "widow," and
the children as "heirs,"15
and came to the conclusion that the widow was not entitled to any part of the proceeds since there was nothing
to which her dower could attach.
Shortly thereafter the court affirmed a judgment
against another insurance association, in a suit by the
widow and children of the assured, merely stating:
It is provided by the certificate, that in the event of the prior
death of the beneficiaries named, the benefit should be paid to
the legal heirs or devisees of the holder of the certificate. A correct reading of this provision would be: in case of the prior death
of any one of the class designated to take the benefit, the heirs
of the holder would take the share of the deceased party. Here,
the plaintiffs were the heirs of the holder, and they took the
whole benefit, and the judgment in their favor was regular, and
16
authorized by law.
It failed to comment on the prior decision in the Gauch
7
case.'
In the same year (1884) the court decided the case of
Kelley et al. v. Vigas et al., i" and while that case is not
quite in point it contains some very interesting dicta so
far as this problem is concerned, as the court was called
upon to construe a will which -concluded, "the remainder
of my estate to be divided equal among my heirs at law."
The court said, in part:
It will be seen the testator, by his will, disposed of. the remainder
of'his estate to his "heirs at law, ". but made no devise of -it.to
any one by name, other than designating them as a class. The
15 88 IIl. 251, 256.
16Covenant Mutual Benefit Ass'n v. Hoffman, 110 l11. 603, 607 (1884).
17 88 II1. 251, supra, footnote 15.
18 112 Ill.
242. .
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word "heir," it is said, when uncontrolled by the context, designates the person appointed by law to succeed to the estate in
question, as in case of intestacy, and so the authorities seem to
hold. Who are heirs of a deceased person is determined and
declared by statute, and the quantity each shall take, as heir,
is also fixed. Observing these rules of construction, it would seem
the residue of the estate of the testator should be divided in accordance with the provisions of the statute, as in cases of
intestacy. 19
Thus, .the court pointed out that the use of the term
"heir" was to be construed as meaning that class of persons who would take by virtue of the Illinois statutes
rather than those included in the common law definition
of the word.
The insurance problem came up for further examination in 1888 in a case where the deceased insured left a
widow but no issue, and the certificate was made pay20
able to "the devisees or heirs at law" of the member.
The court refused to depart from the theory that heirs
were to be ascertained from a reference to the statute,
and if the spouse was included therein, then that she was
an heir even to the exclusion of all other kin.
Several years passed before the case of Smith v. Winsor was decided. 2 ' This suit presented a state of facts
wherein the testator, after giving his widow a life estate
with power to sell and convey, and the right to dispose of
the remainder by will as she saw fit for charitable purposes only, provided that at her death the remainder of
the estate was "to descend to my heirs at law in the
proportion designated and provided by the Statutes of
the State of Illinois." Testator left no issue, and two
weeks after his death, his wife died intestate. The statutory heirs of the wife, in a suit for partition of the lands,
claimed that one-half of the realty had vested in them on
the theory that the wife was included in the remainder
over to "my heirs at law," while the collateral relatives
19 112 I1. 242, 245.
20 Alexander v. Northwestern Masonic Aid Ass'n, 126 Ill. 558, 18 N. E. 556.
.. .......
21 239 I1. 567, 88 N. E. 482 (1909)...............
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of the testator contended that the language was restricted
to mean heirs of the blood of the testator. The Supreme
Court in passing on this case did not object to the previous refusal of the earlier courts to follow the common
law definition of the term used. In fact, they agreed
specifically that a widow was, in a case like this, included
as an heir within the strict legal sense of the term, but
they decided against the wife's heirs on the ground that
they believed the testator had used the words in a colloquial and popular sense, and that they would have to
apply his intention rather than the technical definition
of the term. Since the cardinal rule of construction, especially in the case of wills, is the application of the intention of the parties where it does not violate positive rules
of law, no objection can be made to the decision of the
court in this case, except that the court did not seem to
give consideration to the additional words referring to
the local statute, which additional words have generally
been held to display an intention to include statutory,
rather than common law, heirs within the meaning of the
term used.22
Following this case came the decision in Black v.
Jones," where the court had occasion to pass on a will
which provided several absolute gifts to the widow of
both realty and personalty, and placed the remainder of
the estate in trust for the benefit of the widow for her
life, with a remainder over on her death to "my heirs at
law living at the time of my death." Although the testator left no issue, it was held that the widow received
no part of the trust realty, because, although recognizing
the general rule in Illinois that the word "heirs," in its
legal sense, meant those whom the law appointed to take
the intestate estate, the court found the intention of the
testator was such as to exclude her, at the same time pointing out that the widow did not always take a vested interest in her husband's realty, hence could not generally be
understood to be an heir.
22

See footnote 63, post.

23 264 Ill. 548, 106 N. E. 462 (1914).
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In 1916 the court had an opportunity to establish the
rule to be applied in cases like these, where the will contains a reference to the local statute, but failed to do so
on the ground that it would follow the intention of the
testator. The particular case before it, McGinnis v. Campbell,24 involved a will by which the remainder over, after
life estate to the widow, was given to "my legal heirs at
the time of my decease, to be distributed to them according to the laws of descent of the State of Illinois." The
testator died without issue, and the statute at that time
would have given the widow one-half in fee. After pointing out that while it was not contrary to law to give a
life tenant an interest in the fee also, although such a
situation was unusual, the court decided that the testamentary scheme was intended to give the widow a life
estate only, and that the heirs referred to in the will were
the testator's blood heirs, and having arrived at that
conception of his intention, the court, of course, decided
against the claim of the widow.
When deciding the case of Walker, Trustee v. Walker
et al.,25 in 1918, the court gave an interest in personalty
to the husband of a deceased legatee, relying on the reference in the will to the Statute of Descent as displaying
an intention on the part of the testator to use the term
in some other than its common law meaning. In the light
of the previous decisions of the court, the language with
reference to the intention of the testator would seem
gratuitous but for the decision in the Gauch case, which
was relied on by the trustee to deprive the husband of
the legatee of any share of the estate. The court distinguished the two cases on the ground of the additional
language used in the will in the Walker case, and went on
to state:
But where there is an express reference, as here, to the statute
of distribution, and the husband would take under such statute
of distribution, by the great weight of authority in this and
24274 fI1.
82, 113 N. E. 102 (1916).
25283 IIl. 11, 118 N. E. 1014 (1918).
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other jurisdictions, and by sound reasoning, the husband must
'
be held to be included in the term "heirs at law. "26

This case is the last word from the Supreme Court of
Illinois on the subject of personalty, and clearly evidences an intention to differ from the ancient common
law meaning of the word heir.
A suit for partition, entitled Henkins et al. v. Henkins
et al.,27 decided in 1919, resulted in the widow of the life
tenant, a daughter-in-law of the testator, receiving a
share in the fee simple title to lands, from her deceased
husband, not because of any reference to the Statute of
Descent as occurred in the previous cases mentioned, but
because her husband (the life tenant) had been given an interest in the remainder through failure on the part of the
testator to set the time of determining the class of heirs
as of the date of the life tenant's death. Having found
that the life tenant was not to be excluded from the class,
since he lived after the testator, the passage of the estate
in lands to the widow came about through intestate law
rather than under the devise in the will.
The decision in Peacock v. McCluskey 28 is not quite
pertinent to this problem, but in. determining whether or
not the rule in Shelley's case was applicable to the devise
in question, the court held that the facts did not warrant
construing the language of the devise to exclude the husband of the testatrix from the remainder over after a life
estate which had been given to "my son .... and at his

death to be distributed among his heirs according to the
laws of this state" by saying, "Having determined that
testatrix used the word 'heirs' in its technical sense, then
by the use of the term she brings the devise within the
rule in Shelley's case ... '2' hence the husband might be
one of the heirs, and the life tenant was held to have
received a fee simple estate.
An interesting situation developed in the case of Belle283
27287
28 296
29 296
26

IM. 11,
Ill.
62,
Ill.
87,
Il1. 87,

27.
122 N. E. 88 (1919).
129 N. E. 561 (1921).
91.
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ville Savings Bank v. Aneshaensel,0 heard in 1921,
wherein both realty and personalty were involved. Here
the testator had a life insurance policy payable to his
wife as beneficiary, and also gave her certain personalty
for life with a remainder over to "the heirs of my said
wife." The wife predeceased the testator, and upon his
death a dispute arose between the heirs of the wife and
the heirs of the testator as to which class should receive
the property mentioned. It was held that as to the life
insurance, she having died intestate, her husband was her
sole heir, and of course his relatives were entitled to the
proceeds thereof; but as to the personalty given by the
will, even though the husband was within the language
used, the evident testamentary scheme was to exclude the
husband from the class, and so it was awarded to the
relatives of the wife. The will also devised certain realty
to the wife, but this devise was held to have lapsed by
her death before the testator, hence would pass to the
husband's heirs. While the decision contains language
with regard to the meaning of the term "heirs," the case
turns upon the intention of the testator and throws but
little light on the attitude of the court toward this
problem.
In Potter v. Potter,3 1 decided in 1922, the testator had
given his wife a life estate in certain lands, and provided
for a remainder over "to be equally divided between our
living children or to their living heirs." This language
was held sufficient to include the wife of one child and
the husband of another, both of whom had died in the
lifetime of the testator without issue, on the ground that
the word "heirs" was a technical word with a fixed legal
meaning, and, unless controlled by or inconsistent with
the context, must be interpreted according to its strict
technical meaning as importing those persons designated
by law to succeed to the estate in case of intestacy. On
rehearing the court passed on the question of the claimed
30298 Il. 292, 131 N. E. 682 (1921).

81306 IIl. 37, 137 N. E. 425 (1922).
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intention of the testator to mean issue of his blood, by
saying:
Had the testator intended to narrow the meaning of the word
"heirs" and to use it in the sense of children or descendants, the
proper and the only legal way to have accomplished that purpose
would have been to use the ordinary legal words that are commonly employed for that purpose, such as "bodily heirs" or
2
"heirs of their bodies," or words of similar import.8
Justice Cartwright dissented from the decision, but solely
on the grounds of the intention of the testator, and not
on the legal definition of the terms used in the will.
That the widow is not an heir when the statutory estate
awarded to her is less than a fee-simple, was decided in
m where the testatrix placed
the case of Emery v. Emery,"
her realty in trust with directions to convey the property
to her children on January 1, 1925, if they were then living, or to "their heirs" if dead. One son died before the
date named, leaving a widow and issue, and prior to the
1923 amendment of the Descent Act. The court applied
the technical definition to the term "heirs," and awarded
the estate to those named in the statute of descent, but
pointed out that prior to the 1923 amendment the widow
only received dower where issue survived, hence she
could not take under the will in question.
Among the Appellate Court decisions in fllinois on this
problem we find the case of Lawwill v. Lawwil, 8 4 involving the proceeds of a mutual benefit certificate made payable to the heirs of the member. The court held that the
term was to be defined in the light of the prevailing statute, and since the member left no issue and the subject
matter was personalty, the widow was awarded the entire
proceeds.
Also in point is the case of Harris v. Rhodes.85 Here
the second husband of the testator's widow was given a
32 306 Ill.
37, 45.

33325 111. 212, 156 N. E. 364 (1927).
8429 I1. App. 643 (1888).
35 130 Ill. App. 233 (1906).
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share in personalty arising under the doctrine of equitable conversion from a direction in the will to the executor
to sell the realty on the death of the widow and to distribute the proceeds to certain named persons and the
remainder "among the heirs at law of my said wife."
The court again applied the statutory definition of the
term, but pointed out that the husband was not entitled
to the entire balance because the will directed an equal
disribution among the heirs of the wife, and this language
indicated an intention on the part of the testator to substitute a different plan of distribution from that provided
in the statute.
Summarizing briefly, therefore, we find that in Illinois,
in the absence of a contrary intention which is to be
drawn from the will itself, the surviving spouse will be
included in the term "heir," whether used simpliciter
or in conjunction with a reference to the Statute of
Descent and Distribution, and whether realty or personalty is involved, if, in fact, the statute would give the
spouse an absolute estate, and that the common law definition of the term as meaning blood relatives of the deceased ancestor is no longer recognized.
Illinois was by no means the first state to repudiate
the common law definition of heir or next of kin. The
honor in that regard belongs to the North Carolina Supreme Court which court in 1826 in a lengthy and well
written opinion by Justice Henderson gave full consideration to the basis for the use of the term "heir." He
said:
He on whom the law casts an inheritance on the death of the
ancestor is designated by the technical word heir .... Does the
widow who succeeds to the estate of her deceased husband under
the act of 1801 come to the estate by purchase or descent7 For
she must come in by the one or the other of these two ways;
there is no other. It is very clear that she does not come in by
purchase; that is, by her own act she is perfectly passive; it is
thrown upon her by law, as much as it is thrown upon the uncle,
there being no issue, brothers or sisters, or their issue .... If
she does not come in by the purchase, it follows that she comes
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in by descent. She is, therefore, in such case, the heir of the
30
husband. Yet she is not of his blood.
Pertinent comment from some of the decisions of other
states on this subject will serve to illustrate their attitude
in seeking to minimize the effect of the ancient views regarding heirship. Thus California states:
The "heirs" of a person are those whom the law appoints to
succeed to his estate in case he dies without disposing of it by
will. In this state the heirs ... are determined by the provisions
of section 1386, Civ. Code, and the use of the term "heirs" in an
instrument of conveyance to designate the persons in whom the
estate granted is to vest will, in the absence of any qualifying
7
terms, be construed to mean the heirs as thus ascertained.
In Colorado, where a contingent remainder had been
given by will to the heirs of the life tenant, it was held
that when the life tenant died leaving a widow surviving
the contingency had been met, and the widow took the
devise. 8 From Connecticut comes the following language:
The original and underlying reason for presuming that the word
"heirs" referred to those who would inherit real estate was that
that was the historical significance of the word, and it was more
probable than otherwise that the testator understood it to have
that meaning. Under the feudal conceptions of the early English
law, the descent of real estate was of primary importance, while
the descent of personal property was of little consequence. Not
only as a word of art, but in common parlance, the word "heirs"
thus signified those who inherited real estate. While the rule
came to us from this source, the reason for it has never existed
to any extent in this country. In the absence here of the historical feudal background, the sanction for the technical definition of the word seems to be largely lacking. On the contrary,
our conception of property has never given predominant importance to real estate. The popular conception of inheritance
in this country included personal as well as real property, the
36Croom v. Herring, 11 N. C. 393, 394-397 (1826).
37 Hocbstein v. Berghauser, 123 Cal. 681, 56 P. 547, 549 (1899).
38 Binkley v. Switzer, 75 Colo. 1, 223 P. 757 (1924).
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historical distinction between the two has disappeared, and today
personal property is of equal importance with real estate as the
subject of inheritance. Indeed, we cannot reasonably assume
that a testator today in the use of the word "heirs" intends to
suggest only one who inherits real estate but rather one who
inherits property generally. As matter of fact, there are probably few testators who ever heard of the historical meaning of
the word. It has acquired a broader meaning, and is defined in
dictionaries as those who inherit property generally. Its original
or historical meaning is given secondary place only, and may
fairly be said not to exist at all in the popular mind. Since the
intent of the testator is always the controlling purpose of the
construction of wills, this modern conception of the word in the
popular mind cannot rightly be ignored. Usage makes language,
and, the historical significance of this word being largely lost,
the intent of those who make wills will obviously best be found
by giving it the popular and generally understood meaning. To
adhere to the historical meaning under such circumstances would
more often than otherwise defeat the real intent of the testator.3 9
Extracted from a recent decision in a Kentucky case4" is
this language:
• . . but when she [testatrix] added the language, "in accordance with the law laid down by the statutes of the state of Kentucky" she, in effect, gave a definition to, and indicated the
sense in which she intended to employ, the words "heirs at law,"
and which was, that by the use of such words she intended to
include all those who would take the property under the "statutes of the state of Kentueky."'41

While in 1873 Massachusetts had held in the case of
Haradenv. Larrabeethat a mere reference to the Statute
of Distributions was not sufficient to include a widow of
the testator,4 2 the same court in 1887 was asserting:
If, in determining who are heirs, we depart from our statutes,
and go back to the common law ...

we might be required to rec-

89 Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v. Lawrence, 106 Conn. 178, 138 A. 159,
160-1 (1927).
40 Vandyke v. Vandyke, 223 Ky. 49, 2 S. W. (2d) 1057 (1928).
41 2 S. W. (2d) 1057, 1059.
42 113 Mass. 430 (1873).
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ognize rules of descent for estates in fee-simple which have not
been in force in the territory of this commonwealth since the
4
passage of chapter 14 of the Province Laws, 1692-3. 3
And, acting under a statute passed in 1880, the court gave
a husband an estate in lands devised to certain persons
for life with remainder to "their respective heirs" by
pointing out:
Although, in the case at bar, the heirs of Susan do not take
from her by inheritance, but take as persons designated by the
will; yet we know of no way of determining the persons intended
by the will except by ascertaining the persons who by law would
have inherited the estate from her if she had died seized of it and
44
intestate.
In 1909, Massachusetts again had the same situation before it as it had in the Haraden case, but this time the
court held for the widow, because "whether the phrase
under all circumstances necessarily is equivalent to legal
heirs or whether it may sometimes have the meaning of
heirs by the blood, or possibly some other significance,"
from the will under consideration it was evident that the
testator intended to have his estate distributed according
45
to the statutes of descent.
Nebraska pointed out that since 1907, when the estates
of dower and curtesy were abolished in that jurisdiction,
the husband and wife were considered heirs of each other,
stating: "Unless excluded by unambiguous words or by
clear implication from the language used in a will, the
description therein of 'heirs' includes a surviving spouse
as well as a surviving child or surviving children." ' 46
North Carolina, following the early decision mentioned
before, has frequently held, at least in so far as personalty was concerned, that the use of the term "heirs," even
simpliciter, would send the court to the local statute of
distributions as its guide, not only to ascertain who shall
Lavery v. Egan, 143 Mass. 389, 393, 9 N. E. 747, 750 (1887).
143 Mass. 389, 393, 9 N. E. 747, 750.
45 Peabody v. Cook, 201 Mass. 218, 87 N. E. 466, 467 (1909).
46 In re Hanson's Estate, 118 Neb. 208, 224 N. W. 2, 5 (1929).
43

44
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succeed, but how they shall succeed and in what proportions. 4 7 Even in Pennsylvania, where the state of the law
is such that the use of the word "heirs" simpliciter
would probably result in barring a spouse from the estate, the court recognizes the probable altered intention
of the testator when additional language is present, for
we find this language in a decision rendered in 1915:
. . the only reasonable meaning to be given to its words is that
she intended to save every legacy ...to those who would take
• .. under the intestate laws of the state. The words "next of
kin" are to regarded as superfluous, or as having been used ...

in their popular sense, meaning those who are entitled to the
personal estate of a decedent under the statute of distribution. 48
In 1931, in a case where personalty was involved, the
court did not need the reference to the statute to include
a widow, but instead pointed out that unless a contrary
intent is indicated by the will a widow will be considered
an heir of her husband, because, it was said, "where the
word 'heirs' is used in a bequest of personalty it means
heirs as ascertained by the statutes of distribution." 4' 9
In accord with this view is the decision from South
Carolina handed down in 1916, where it was said that
when the word "heirs" is used in a will and it does not
appear from the context who were intended to be included, then it becomes necessary to resort to the statute
of distributions for the purpose of ascertaining those who
are included within that term; and the court awarded a
share in the testator's realty to his widow, she being
within the definition of the term thus applied.5 0
It would be possible to quote from many other decisions
along the same line, but for outstanding examples of the
extent to which some states may go in substituting a
statutory definition for the common law meaning of
"heir" or "next of kin" reference is made to the legal
47
48
49

Freeman v. Knight, 37 N. C. 72 (1841).
In re Garrett's Estate, 249 Pa. 249, 94 A. 927, 928 (1915).
In re Simpson's Estate, 304 Pa. 396, 156 A. 91, 93 (1931).

r° Gardner v. Horton, 105 S. C. 127, 89 5. E. 637, 638 (1916).
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history of Connecticut and Michigan. Both of these states
started out by excluding the spouse, but as the descent
and distribution statutes were changed from time to time,
both have come to hold that the words mentioned include
the spouse whether used simpliciter or with a reference
to the statute, and regardless of whether the subject matter be realty or personalty.
On the other hand a number of states have flatly refused to adopt any other definition than that which prevailed at common law, at least in so far as wills are concerned, even in the face of their own liberal statutes giving the spouse a vested absolute share in the deceased
spouse's intestate estate. Among these states are Iowa,
which holds to the view that there is a marked difference
in common parlance between "widow" and "heir. ' ' 51
Maine has several cases all holding that regardless what
statutory estate the spouse may receive in the other's
estate, the spouse does not take as an heir. 52 New Hampshire says that ordinarily, in the absence of evidence
showing a different intention, the word will be understood as used in its legal sense, but qualified this by saying that in the interpretation of a will very little competent evidence may be sufficient to show that the testator
used53 the words in a broader sense than their legal meaning. New York holds that the presence of additional
language is not sufficient to enlarge the class of legatees
to include the spouse 4 and that in the absence of anything
showing a different intention the words will be limited to
mean relatives in blood, as they have not, by legal usage
or general custom, come to mean anything else.5 5 Virginia, in 1903, preferred to follow the English Chancery
Court decisions and those of. Massachusetts, but has not
since had occasion to review the question in the light of
51 Phillips v. Carpenter, 79 Iowa 600, 44 N. W. 898 (1890).
52 Morse v. Ballou, 112 Me. 124, 90 A. 1091 (1914); McCarthy v. Walsh,
123 Me. 157, 122 A. 406 (1923).
53Wilkins v. Ordway,- '59 N. H. 378, 47 Am. Rep. 215, 216 (1879).
54 Luce v. Dunham, 69 N. Y. 36 (1877).
55 Tillman v. Dayis, 95 N. Y. 17 47 Arp., Rep.. 1.(1884) ..
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the changes made in the decisions. of the latter court. 6
The sole case from Texas is in accord with these decisions, but carries the proviso that regardless of the
technical meaning of the words legal heirs, if the intention of the testator can be ascertained from the will itself,
then such meaning they must bear. 7
We thus find that, depending on the nature of the property involved, or the presence or absence of a reference
in the will to the local laws of descent, or the appearance
in the will of a definite testamentary intention, the courts
may answer the question of the spouse's right to take as
an heir in different ways.
Statistically considered, when realty is involved and
the term "heir" is used simpliciter, in a total of sixty-five
cases, the attitude of the courts is generally to bold in
favor of the blood kin and against the spouse on any of
the following grounds:
58
1. That the word still bears its common law meaning.
2. That the will contains an evident intention to exclude the spouse. 9
56 Allison v. Allison's Executors, 101 Va. 537, 44 S. E. 904 (1903).
57 Peet v. Commerce etc. R. R. Co., 70 Tex. 522, 8 S. W. 203, 205 (1888).
58 Perry v. Bulkley, 82 Conn. 158, 72 A. 1014 (1909); Mason v. Baily, 6
Del. Ch. 129, 14 A. 309 (1888); Hanvy v. Moore, 140 Ga. 691, 79 S. E.
772 (1913) . Prather v. Prather, 58 Ind. 141 (1877) ; McMenomy v. McMenomy,
22 Iowa 148 (1867); Journell v. Leihton, 49 Iowa 601 (1878); Blackman v.
Wadsworth, 65 Io"'a 80, 21 N. W. 190 (1884); Murphy v. Murphy, 190 Iowa
874, 179 N. W. 530 (1920) ; Trott v. Kendall, 125 Me. 85, 130 A. 878 (1925) ;
Shriver v. Shriver, 127 Md. 486, 96 A. 615 (1916); Fabens v. Fabens, 141
Mass. 395, 5 N. E. 650 (1886); Gardner v. Skinner, 195 Mass. 164, 80 N. E.
825 (1907) ; Edwards v. Stults, 97 N. J. Eq. 44, 128 A. 609 (1925) ; Bayley v.
Lawrence, 118 N. Y. S. 286 (1909) ; Dodge's Appeal, 106 Pa. St. 216, 51 Am.
Rep. 519 (1884) ; In re Lesieur's Estate, 205 Pa. 119, 54 A. 579 (1903) ; In re
Raleigh's Estate, 206 Pa. 451, 55 A. 1119 (1903)1
59 Kenan v. Graham, 135 Ala. 585, 33 -So.- 699 (1903) ; Wetter, Trustee, v.
Walker, 62 Ga. 142 (1878); Nunnally v. Foster, 149 Ga. 266, 100 S. E. 1
548, 106 N. E. 462 (1914) ; Rusing v. Rusing,
(1919) ;-Black v. Jones, 264 Ill.
25 Ind. 63 (1865); Brown v. Harmon, 73 Ind. 412 (1881); Wood v. Beasley,
107 Ind. 37, 7 N. E. 331 (1886) ; Coleman v. Coleman, 69 Kan. 39, 76 P. 439
(1904) ; Bailey v. Bailey, 25 Mich. 185 (1872); In re Anderson's Estate, 148
Minn. 44, 180 N. W. 1019 (1921); Jones v. Lloyd, 33 Ohio St. 572 (1878)
Stewart v. Powers, 9 Ohio C. C. 143, 6 Ohio C. D. 101 (1894); Durfee v.
MacNeil, 58 Ohio St. 238, 50 N. E. 721 (1898); Gibson v. Gibson, 113 S. C.
160, 101 S. E. 922 (1910); Bartell v. Edwards, 113 S. C. 217, 102 S. E. 210
(1920Y; Peet -v.Commerce, etc. R, R. Co., 70 Tex. 522, 8 S. W. 203 (1888).
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3. That the statutory estate of the spouse is less than
an interest in fee simple.60
4. That the prior estate on which the rights of the
spouse depended had failed."'
Of these sixty-five cases, however, a total of twenty-four
have included the spouse within the meaning of the term,
because the courts, in the absence on any controlling intention, have defined the term "heir" as including any
person who would62 take of the fee simple under the local
statute of descent.
When realty is involved and the term "heir" is not
used simpliciter, but the will makes reference to the local
statute, the decisions are not uniformly in favor of the
surviving spouse, as would be expected, although the attitude of the courts is generally to include the spouse within
the definition. 3 The decisions against the spouse usually
result because:
00 Wilson v. Fridenburg, 19 Fla. 461 (1882) ; Miller v. Finegan, 26 Fla. 29,
7 So. 140 (1890) ; Emery v. Emery, 325 Ill. 212, 156 N. E. 364 (1927); Rose
v. Rambo, 120 Miss. 305, 82 So. 149 (1919) ; Wells' Guardian v. Moore, 16
Mo. 478 (1852); Wilkins v. Ordway, 59 N. H. 378, 47 Am. Rep. 215 (1879);
Drake v. Pell, 3 Edw. Chan. (N. Y.) 266 (1839).
61 Hartnett v. Langan, 282 Mo. 471, 222 S. W. 403 (1920).
62 Hochstein v. Berghauser, 123 Cal. 681, 56 P. 547 (1899); Wittenbrook
v. Wheadon, 128 Cal. 150, 60 P. 664 (1900) ; Dickey v. Walrond, 200 Cal. 335,
253 P. 706 (1927) ; Daniels and Fisher Realty Co. v. Kenyon, 261 F. 407 (Colo.)
(1919) ; Binkley v. Switzer, 75 Colo. 1, 223 P. 757 (1924) ; Richards v. Miller,
62 Ill. 417 (1872); Kelley v. Vigas, 112 Ill. 242 (1884); Belleville Savings
Bank v. Aneshaensel, 298 Ill. 292, 131 N. E. 682 (1921); Potter v. Potter, 306
Ill. 37, 137 N. E. 425 (1922); Duzan v. Chappel, 41 Ind. App. 651, 84 N. E.
775 (1908); Dodge v. Beeler, 12 Kan. 525 (1874) ; Couch v. Wright, 20 Kan.
103 (1878); Allen v. Foth, 210 Ky. 343, 275 S. W. 804 (1925); Lavery v.
Egan, 143 Mass. 389, 9 N. E. 747 (1887) ; Proctor v. Clark, 154 Mass. 45, 27
N. E. 673 (1891) ; Holmes v. Holmes, 194 Mass. 552, 80 N. E. 614 (1907);
In re Hanson's Estate, 118 Neb. 208, 224 N. W. 2 (1929) ; Weston v. Weston,
38 Ohio St. 473 (1882); Durfee v. MacNeil, 58 Ohio St. 238, 50 N. E. 721
(1898); Connertin v. Concannon, 122 Or. 387, 259 P. 290 (1927); In re
Potter's Estate, 13 Phila. (Pa.) 318 (1880); Seabrook v. Seabrook, 31 S. C.
Eq. (10 Rich.) 495 (1859) ; Turner v. Guest, 117 S. C. 14, 108 S. E. 177
(1921).
63 Morse v. Ward, 92 Conn. 408, 103 A. 119 (1918); Henkins v. Henkins,
287 Ill. 62, 122 N. E. 88 (1919) ; Peacock v.'McCluskey, 296 Ill. 87, 129 N. E.
561 (1921); Peabody v. Cook, 201 Mass. 218, 87 N. E. 466 (1909) ;, In re
Shumway's Estate, 194 Mich. 245, 160 N. W. 595 (1916); In re Mersereau,
77 N. Y. S. 329 (1902) ; Gardner v. Horton, 105 S. C. 127, 89 S. E..637 (1916).
Note: In the Mersereau case, supra, the devise was to "the persons entitled
thereto under and by the laws of the State of New York ;" the court held that
the Tillman case, 95 N. Y. 17, was not controlling because the intention of
the testator was not to give the property to "heirs," which would have excluded
the spouse, but to the "persons" referred to in the state statute.
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1. An intention is expressed in the will to exclude the
spouse."4
2. The court distinguishes or disregards the additional
language. 5
3. The spouse is said to take
by reason of his or her
''66
status and not'as an "heir.
4. The prior estate on which the spouse relies was held
to have failed.
The decisions affecting personal property are also in
conflict, but they are more evenly balanced. In the first
place,
the term "heir" is used in a bequest of this
specieswhen
of property it is legally incorrect. Justice
Henderson pointed out in the case of Croom v. Herring:
It could not originally be used to designate him on whom the law
cast the goods or chattel property, for it cast them on no one;
no person was appointed by law to succeed to the deceased ancestor; on his death they became bona vacantia, and were seized

by the king on that account, and by him, as grand almoner,
applied to pious uses (now considered superstitious) for the good
of the soul of their former owner.6 8
64 In re Wilson's Estate, 184 Cal. 63, 193 P. 581 (1920); Tyler v. Theilia,
124 Ga. 204, 52 S. E. 606 (1905) : Smith v. Winsor, 239 Ill.
567, 88 N. E. 482
(1909) ; McGinnis v. Campbell, 274 II. 82, 113 N. E. 102 (1916).
65 Carter v. Carter, 10 Hawaii 687 (1897) where the court said that "the
additional language relates merely to division and would be implied in the
will anyway." Knickerbocker v. Seymour, 46 Barb. 198 (N. Y. 1863); Lewis
v. Arnold, 42 R. I. 94, 105 AtI. 568 (1919), holding that the reference to the
statute was merely to show that persons were to take per stirpes and not
per capita; Allison v. Allison, 101 Va. 537, 44 S. E. 904 (1903).
66 McCarthy v. Walsh, 123 Me. 157, 122 A. 406 (1923), where court stated,
"The statute does not change the status of the widow with reference to her
deceased husband's estate. It enlarges her interest by giving her an estate in
fee instead of an estate for life. She still takes not as heir, but as widow:"
Richardson v. Martin, 55 N. H. 45 (1874) ; Dodge's Appeal, 106 Pa. St. 216, 51
Am. Rep. 519 (1884), which points out, "while she acquires an interest or
estate in the land, and not a mere lien thereon, that interest is of a special
and peculiar nature, essentially different from the estate of inheritance which
the law casts upon the heir." These cases overlook the fact that as soon as
the widow has acquired her statutory estate it becomes inheritable property
insofar as her own heirs are concerned, to whom she becomes the ancestor.
67 Farrell v. Cogley, 146 S. W. 315 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
68 11 N. C. 393, 394 (1896).
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Statutes, of course, became necessary to regulate the
passage of personalty upon the death of the owner, and
at common law, this species of property devolved upon
the next of kin, subject, however, to the rights of the husband. The courts have solved the problem arising from
this legal error, however, either by finding that the word
"heir" is used in connection with a blended gift of realty
and personalty, customarily so found in a residuary
clause, hence properly used to describe the one who would
take the realty at common law, and hence the personalty
also,6 9 or they7 have translated the term "heir"
to mean
'' next of kin" or ''statutory distributees. " 71
The decisions regarding personalty, therefore, depend
on which of these methods was used by the court to make
the will, otherwise incorrect, effective, and are aligned
as follows. When the term is used simpliciter, the spouse
has been held to be excluded because:
1. The literal common law meaning of the term "heir"
has been applied regardless of the species of property
involved. 2
2. The word has been translated to mean "next of
kin," which is given a common law definition of blood
78
relatives.
69 Fabens v. Fabens, 141 Mass. 395, 5 N. E. 650 (1886), the court stating,
"There is nothing in the will which shows any intention that the real estate
should go in one direction and the personal in another. The provision is a
single one ....
In Allison v. Allison, 101 Va. 537, 44 S. E. 904, 913 (1903),
appears the language: ". . . as the residuary clause of the will blends real and
personal estate and gives it to the heirs at law of the testator, the persons
answering that description should enjoy the whole. .. "
70 Edwards v. Stults, 97 N. J. Eq. 44, 128 A. 609 (1925).
71 For an example of the use of the term "distributees" see Eby's Appeal,
84 Pa. 241 (1877), but notice the criticism in Henry v. Henry, 31 N. C. 278,
especially pp. 285-6, regarding the use of the word "distributees" which was
then apparently an innovation.
72 Ruggles v. Randall, 70 Conn. 44, 38 A. 885 (1897) ; Miller v. Metcalf, 77
Conn. 176, 58 A. 743 (1904) ; Harrell v. Osborne, 12 Ky. Law Rep. 686; Lord
v. Bourne, 63 Me. 368 (1873); Herrick v. Low, 103 Me. 353, 69 A. 314 (1907);
Houghton v. Hughes, 108 Me. 233, 79 A. 909 (1911) ; Morse v. Ballou, 112 Me.
124, 90 A. 1091 (1914).
73 Townsend v. Radcliffe, 44 Ill. 446 (1867); McMurphy v. Boyles, 49 Ill.
110 (1868); Richardson v. Martin, 55 N. H. 45 (1874); Tillman v. Davis, 95
N. Y. 17, 47 Am. Rep. 1 (1884); Snider v. Snider, 42 N. Y. S. 613 (1896).
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3. The court has found the will to contain an intention
to exclude the spouse."4

4. In construing a local statute, the court impressed
on it a common law meaning and continually applied that
meaning because of the failure of the legislature to amend
7
the statute after it had once been construed.

On the other hand, the spouse has been included in an
equal number of cases, even though the term was used
simpliciter, and in these cases the courts have placed
their decisions on the grounds that:
1. The word would be defined as "next of kin" accord-

ing to the statutes or as "statutory distributees.

7

2. The word would be left untranslated and the stat7
utory definition applied anyway. "
3. The will indicated an intention to include the
spouse.78
As would be expected, when the term "heir" is used
in conjunction with additional words, the majority of the
decisions involving personalty is heavily in favor of including the spouse, and in only one instance has the court
found it necessary to search for the intention of the tes74 Trexler v. Miller, 41 N. C. 248 (1849) ; Henderson v. Henderson, 46 N. C.

221 (1853) ; In re Wunder's Estate, 270 Pa. 281, 113 A. 378 (1921).
75 Overdieck's Will, 50 Iowa 244 (1878).
76 Eddings v. Long, 10 Ala. 203 (1846); Beach v. Meriden Trust and Safe
Dep. Co., 98 Conn. 821, 120 A. 607 (1923) ; Hartford-Connecticut Trust Co. v.
Lawrence, 106 Conn. 178, 138 At. 159 (1927) ; Shriver v. Shriver, 127 Md.
486, 96 A. 615 (1916); International Trust Co. v. Williams, 183 Mass. 173, 66
N. E. 798 (1903) ; Sherburne v. Howland, 239 Mass. 439, 132 N. E. 188 (1921) ;
Freeman v. Knight, 37 N. C. 72 (1841) ; Corbett v. Corbett, 54 N. C. 114
(1853); Ferguson and wife v. Stuart's Executors, 14 Ohio 140 (1846); Eby's
Appeal, 84 Pa. St. 241 (1877); In re Ashton's Estate, 7 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 366
(1889); In re Simpson's Estate, 304 Pa. 396, 156 A. 91 t1931); Evans v.
Harllee, 9 Rich. (S. C. Law) 501 (1855).
77 Harris v. Rhodes, 130 fI1. App. 233 (1906) ; Brooks v. Parks, 189 Mich.
490, 155 N. W. 573 (1915).
78 Fidelity and Columbia Trust Co. v. Vogt, 250 S. W. 486 (Ky. 1923)
In re Scott's Will, 204 N. Y. S. 478 (1924).
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tator.9 1 There are six decisions against the spouse, but
these depend on the testamentary intention,8 0 or the particular emphasis that New York has placed on the term
"next of kin" when used with other language, giving this
term its original common-law meaning."'
The proceeds of life insurance policies, although a species of personalty, have been distinguished by the courts
from the general rules, and while most courts will award
the proceeds to the spouse either by applying the statutory definition 2 or an intention of the assured as drawn
from provisions in the charter of the insurance association or other facts,"8 it is possible to find early cases
where the spouse was excluded. These cases, however,
turn on the fact that at the time of the decision the spouse
was given only a dower interest in the personalty, 4 or
that, in line with other decisions of the same state, the
spouse had been held outside of the term "heir" for some
179 In re Newman's Estate, 68 Cal. App. 420, 229 P. 898 (1924); Rawson
v. Rawson, 52 Ill. 62 (1869) ; Walker v. Walker, 283 Ill. 11, 118 N. E. 1014
(1918) , Clay v. Clay, 63 Ky. 295 (1865) ; Lee v. Belknap, 163 Ky. 418, 173
S. W. 1129 (1915) ; Vandyke v. Vandyke, 223 Ky. 49,2 S. W. (2d) 1057 (1928)
Hascall v. Cox, 49 Mich. 435, 13 N. W. 807 (1882); In re Fretheim's Estate,
156 Minn. 366, 194 N. W. 766 (1923) ; Knickerbocker v. Seymour, 46 Barb.
198 (N. Y. 1863); In re Slosson's Est., 149 N. Y. S. 797 (1914); Croom v.
Herring, 11 N. C. 393. (1826) ; Brown v. Brown, 37 N. C. 309 (1842); In re
Garrett's Estate, 249 Pa. 249, 94 A. 927 (1915). In the case of Lawrence v.
Crane, 158 Mass. 392, 33 N. E. 605 (1893), the court looked to the additional
words as an indication of the testator's intention, which was probably necessary
at that time, because the Massachusetts courts had not yet repudiated the
common law definition of the term "heir."
80 Haraden v. Larrabee, 113 Mass. 430 (1873) ; Commercial Trust Co. v.
Gould, 168 A. 822 (N. J. Eq. 1933).
81 Murdock v. Ward, 67 N. Y. 387 (1876) ; Luce v. Dunham, 69 N. Y. 36
(1877) ; Keteltas v. Keteltas, 72 N. Y. 312, 28 Am. Rep. 155 (1878) ; Platt v.
Mickle, 137 N. Y. 106, 32 N. E. 1070 (1893).
82 Mullen v. Reed, 64 Conn. 240, 29 A. 478 (1894) ; Covenant Mutual Benefit
Ass'n v. Hoffman, 110 Ill. 603 (1884); Alexander v. Northwestern Masonic
Aid Ass'n, 126 Ill. 558, 18 N. E. 556 (1888) ; Lawwill v. Lawwill, 29 Ill. App."
643 (1888) ; Thompson v. N. W. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 161 Iowa 446, 143
N. W. 518 (1913) ; Lyons v. Yerex, 100 Mich. 214, 58 N. W. 1112 (1894).
83 Kentucky Masonic Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Miller's Administrator, 76
Ky. 489 (1877) ; Addison v. New England Commercial Travelers Ass'n, 144
Mass. 591, 12 N. E. 407 (1887) ; Kaiser v. Kaiser, 13 Daly 522, 1 N. Y. St. Rep.
258 (1886) ; Walsh v. Walsh, 73 Super. Ct. N. Y. 297 (1892).

84 Johnson v. Supreme Lodge of Knights of Honor, 53 Ark. 255, 13 S. W.
794 (1890) ; Gauch v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., 88 Ill. 251 (1878).
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other reason."' To correct such decisions, Iowa enacted
a special statute which expressly included the spouse in
the proceeds of life insurance, even though the policy
be made payable to the "heirs" of the assured, which
statute has had the effect of overruling one of the cases
against the spouse.86
From a consideration of the decisions and the attitude
of the courts on this subject we achieve the result that
for the purposes of the practitioner, the rules evolved
by the courts may be succinctly stated as follows:
Generally speaking the word ''heir" or "heir at law,"
when used in a will in its common law technical sense does
not include the spouse, but when the term "heir," so
used, is qualified by its connection with other sufficient
words, it will usually be given a non-technical meaning
so as to include the wife or husband as heir. Thus, where
is used, not simpliciter, but in
the term "heirs"
connection with other words, or where there is an express
reference to the statute of distributions or descent, and
the surviving spouse is capable of taking thereunder, he
or she will take by virtue of the term "heirs" or like
words. When the surviving spouse is made a statutory
heir, he or she will generally take, but not where the
interest as by way of dower, or some
spouse takes 8 an
7
right.
marital
But even the presence of such rules may not be helpful
in any particular case since the courts are primarily
concerned with applying, the intention of the testator,
and they will follow that intention, if clearly shown, without regard to technical definitions of terms used in the
will. Such statements as that presented above are only
helpful in ascertaining the intention of the testator when
the will is silent as to his true purpose. It is suggested
85Phillips

v. Carpenter, 79 Iowa 600, 44 N. W. 898 (1890).

86 Thompson v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Co., 161 Iowa 446, 143

N. W. 518 (1913).
87 This statement is based on Thompson, Construction and Interpretation of
Wills (1928), sec. 170, pp. 298 et. seq., as modified by the writer. A portion
of the language in the text cited is taken from Higginbothom v. Higginbothom,
177 Ky. 271. 197 S. W. 627 (1917).
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that the expenditure of a few extra words in drafting
wills may have the effect of preventing litigation of the
type herein commented upon. For example, a bequest or
devise "to my heirs at law (or next of kin) as if I had
died intestate and unmarried" clearly illustrates an intention to exclude the spouse of the testator. If the
testator desires to include his spouse, the clause might
well read, "to my heirs at law (or next of kin) according to the statutes of this state, including among such
heirs my wife A if she should survive me." 8 Note, however, that unless the will directs distribution to be made
among the next of kin "equally" or in some other way
which will indicate an intention to effect a distribution
described by a statute in existence at the time the will is
drafted, the testator's intent may be defeated, for distribution will be made according to the plan laid down by
the statute at the time of the testator's death, which may
be varied between the time of drafting the will and the
time of its operation. 9
In keeping with the spirit of change in the law, the
writer favors the uniform adoption by the courts of the
statutory definition 9° for "heir" which will include the
spouse, rather than the maintenance of those distinctions
which may have been appropriate generations ago when
feudal policies prevailed but which do not now meet with
uniform approval in a democratic civilization. The trend
of modern decisions, at least, is in that direction.
ADDENDA
Since the foregoing article was written the Appellate
Court for the Second District of Illinois has given fur88The use of the last clause in the devise is recommended to prevent the
distribution of any of the testator's property to the heirs of the wife if she
should predecease the testator and he then die without changing his will.
89Sturgis v. Ewing, 18 Ill. 176 (1856); Sherburne v. Howland, 239 Mass.
439, 132 N. E. 188 (1921).
90 Potter's Est., 13 Phila. 318 (Pa. 1880) contains the statement that "Chief
Justice Tilghman has defined heirs as the persons who are representatives of
the decedent by the law of the country." Reference to the local statute, therefore, determines who shall take and in what proportion, and all named therein
should be included within the term "heirs."
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ther consideration to the problem and has produced an
anomalous decision in the case of Hall v. Ray, Executor,9 1
which requires comment.
In that case the testatrix, Mary Wetzel, gave her estate
to an executor with directions to convert the estate into
personalty and, after a life-estate therein to her husband,
directed the division of the corpus among her sister,
brothers, and the child of a deceased brother equally, and
further provided that in case of the death of either before
testatrix or life tenant died then the portion given such
legatee "shall be equally divided among his or her lawful heirs."I
A brother of the testatrix died testate in 1928 after
her death, but before that of the life tenant, leaving a
widow and no issue surviving him, and in his will he
gave his widow his entire estate. The widow filed a
claim against the estate of the life tenant, he having been
appointed executor under the will in question, demanding
a one-fifth interest in the corpus of the estate of Mary
Wetzel, as the sole heir, devisee and legatee of her deceased husband. This claim wos denied in the county
and circuit courts of Warren county, and came before
the appellate court, which decided at the June, 1934, term
that the claimant was not entitled to take under the will
of Mary Wetzel as "heir" of her deceased husband.
The opinion, relying on three cases,92 states that the
Statute of Descent making the surviving widow an heir
of her deceased husband applies only in case two things
concur: (1) that the husband die without child or children or descendants, and (2) that he die intestate; and,
while recognizing that the legatee in question left no
issue, the*court found that the claimant's husband had
died testate and held the statutory requirements were not
satisfied, hence she could not be an heir.
Further examination of the cases cited indicates that
they do not justify their application in the instant case.
91275 Ill. App. 344.
92 Gauch v. St. Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co., 88 Ill. 251; Alexander v. Northwestern Masonic Aid Ass'n, 126 II. 558; Rolofson v. Rolofson, 246 Ill. App. 305.
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Ti the Gauch case9 3 and the Rolofson case 4 the deceased
persons left children or descendants, which is not the
situation in the instant case, and it was then rightly held
on the statutes existent at the time" that the widow's
share was that of dower or its equivalent. The third case
cited, that of Alexander v. Northwestern Masonic Aid
Ass'nPl wherein the insured died intestate leaving a
widow and collateral heirs surviving, decided that the
term "devisees or heirs at law" in an insurance policy
included the widow and awarded her the proceeds thereof,
on the ground that "it is the actual capacity of inheritance at the time of the death of the owner of the property, and not the fact that a particular person might have
inherited from him under a state of facts which did not
exist, that determines who is heir," 97 and held that reference to the Statute of Descent was all that was necessary
to determine that capacity. 9 If anything was decided in
this case, it more nearly supported the contention of the
appellant in the case under consideration than the decision of the appellate court, particularly since in each
instance personalty was involved, and the facts are parallel, with the exception that in the Alexander case the
insured died intestate while in the instant case the husband died testate.
The Appellate Court appears to have overlooked the
99 decided by the Supreme
case of Potter v. Potter,
Court
of Illinois in 1922, which in turn parallels the instant case
in many respects, although the estate -appears to have
consisted of realty. l0 0 The language in the Potter will
was treated as being substantial in effect, and the widow
of a son and the husband of a deceased daughter were
93 88 11. 251 (1878). See footnote 14.
94 246 111. App. 305 (1927).
95 See Black v. Jones, footnote 23.

96 126 Il.558, 18 N. E. 556.
97 126 Il.558, 565.
98 Affirming same case in 27 Ill.
App. 29.
99 306 Ill. 37, 137 N. E. 425.
'100 The facts and the reasons controlling the decision in the Potter case
appear supra, footnote 31.
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held to be entitled to take the shares which the respective
spouses would have taken had they lived. Of equal weight
are the earlier Supreme Court decisions in the Rawson
case and the Richards case heretofore commented upon.' 01
The remaining point to the decision under consideration rests upon the effect of the fact that the child through
whom the appellant claimed had died testate, which, so
the appellate court insisted, operated to remove her from
the class of heirs named in the will, although, inferentially, they would have allowed her to recover had he died
intestate. Had the appellant been obliged to rely on the
will of her husband to claim the share in question, it is
conceded that she could not have succeeded unless her
husband had himself received a vested estate in the fund
during his lifetime on which his will could operate to
transfer the share to appellant. 10 2 In the instant case,
however, the appellant is not, unless limited by the language of her claim, insisting that she participate in the
estate in question because of her husband's will, but
rather that she takes in lieu of him by way of substitution under the will of Mary Wetzel,0 3 and the only way
the heirs of her husband can be determined, as the
Supreme Court of Illinois has stated in numerous instances, 04 is by reference to the Descent Act which alone,
in Illinois, determines heirship."°5 Undue weight, it
would seem, has been accorded to the language of the act
in question pertaining to intestacy, particularly in view
of such cases as Ra'wson v. Rawson, 10 8 Richards v. Mu62, supra, footnote 10, Richards v. Miller, 62
101 Rawson v. Rawson, 52 Ill.
Ill. 417, supra, footnote 12.
102 As to wlether the gift over after the life-estate in the instant case was
vested or contingent, see Henkins v. Henkins, 287 l. 62, 122 N. E. 88, supra,
footnote 27.
37, 137 N. E. 425.
103 See Potter v. Potter, 306 Ill.
104 Rawson v. Rawson, 52 [I. 62, supra, footnote 10; Richards v. Miller, 62
111. 417, supra, footnote 12; Alexander v. Northwestern Masonic Aid Ass'n, 126
Ill.
558, 18 N. E. 556, supra, footnote 20; Belleville Savings Bank v. Aneshaensel, 298 Ill. 292, 131 N. E. 682, supra, footnote 30; Potter v. Potter, 306 1ll.
37, 137 N. E. 425, supra, footnote 31.
105 See Kochersperger v. Drake, 167 IUl. 122, for the right of the legislature
to change the Statute of Descent and to make new classes of heirs.
106 52 I.. 62.
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ler, °7 Kelley et al. v. Vigas,05 and Emery v. Emery,10 9
where, even though the decedent died testate, the Supreme Court of Illinois went direct to the Statute of
Descent to determine heirship.
It is suggested, therefore, in view of the fact that the
precedents relied on do not support the decision, and the
court has apparently misinterpreted the effect of the
Statute of Descent, that the decision in the Hall case is
erroneous and not at all in accord with the decisions of
the Supreme Court of Illinois on this subject.
107

62 Ill. 417.

108 112 Ill. 242.
109 325 Ill. 212, 156 N. E. 364.

Husband of person claiming to inherit died
testate, but since his will did not operate as an execution of a power of appointment, and the statute then only gave his widow dower, she was denied the
right to take as an heir of the original testator, though court said (p. 324),
"The word 'heirs,' when uncontrolled by the context, designates the persons
appointed by law to succeed to the estate in cases of intestacy, and where a
devise is made to a class of persons not named, as heirs at law of the testator,
so that the statute must be invoked to ascertain the persons who take, its provisions as to the quantity each shall take must also be observed."

